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Abstract
This paper examines the effectiveness of allocating funds to the nation’s police
departments for the prevention of domestic terrorism, as is done annually through the
Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Grants Program. The program,
administered by the Federal Emergency Management Administration, has distributed
billions of dollars since its 2003 inception in equipment, software, and technology
services based on the recipient police agencies’ own risk assessments of local terrorism.
Much of the technology desired by police consists of systems of mass surveillance; this
thesis focuses on implementations of surveillance video cameras or CCTV, license plate
readers, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Drawing on academic studies, government
watchdog reports, media coverage, police manuals, nonprofit publications, and
sociological texts, research is guided by the hypotheses that mass surveillance is not
suited for the prevention of terrorism and that grant recipients are requesting and
implementing technology for purposes other than terrorism prevention. Using the
Technology Policy Framework issued by the International Association of Chiefs of Police
in 2014 to assess these implementations, findings include that an approach of surveillance
policing is at odds with both the fundamental policy of policing as crime prevention and
the principal tenet of maintaining citizens’ trust in the police. This thesis reveals a lack of
empirical research on anti-terrorism measures and insufficient evidence that current
surveillance methods prevent crime. Furthermore, due to the recognized low probability
of terrorism, police departments are utilizing grant funds for investigative purposes as
well as the everyday pursuits of retrieving stolen vehicles and monitoring traffic
accidents.
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Introduction
Within days of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the U.S., American
lawmakers began to craft anti-terrorism legislation intended to address the conditions that
enabled these attacks and to prevent future incidents of domestic terrorism. Six weeks
later, the USA PATRIOT Act was unanimously agreed upon by the Senate Judiciary
Committee. When spelled out, the title of the USA PATRIOT Act, passed by Congress
on October 26, 2001, reveals an emphasis not on the goal to reduce the risk of terrorism
but on the chosen strategy to do so:

Uniting and Strengthening America to Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. (Emphasis mine)

Some of the tools chosen for inclusion in the Act consisted of legislation that
dramatically expanded the powers of federal and local law enforcement and curtailed
civil liberties and privacy protections (de la Peña, 2004). According to then-Senator Bob
Barr (R-GA), the bulk of the document placed before the full Senate comprised
legislation that had previously been rejected by Congress, such as the expansion of police
powers and other items that were unrelated to domestic terrorism. For on the day of the
full House and Senate vote, the version of the USA PATRIOT Act agreed by the Senate
Judiciary Committee the evening before was replaced at 3:45am with one prepared in
secret by Attorney General John Ashcroft, the Vice President, and the President (2004).
When accused by members of the Senate Judiciary Committee of switching versions,
Ashcroft responded, “To those who would scare peace-loving people with phantoms of
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lost liberties, my message is this: Your tactics only aid the terrorists” (2004). In spite of
not having read the proposed legislation before them, seemingly cowed by the threat of
appearing pro-terrorist, the country’s elected representatives passed the Act the same day.
Even before the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush created, by
executive order, the Office of Homeland Security on October 8, 2001, with former
Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge as its director (Congressional Research Service,
2002). Not satisfied with that response, then-Senator Joe Lieberman (Ind-CT) introduced
legislation just days later calling for the establishment of a federal department dedicated
to homeland security. On July 16, 2002, the term “homeland security” entered the body
politic through publication by the President’s Office of Homeland Security of The
National Strategy for Homeland Security, a 90-page document announcing the formation
of a new federal department. The Department of Homeland Security was to facilitate
information sharing among intelligence agencies and to fund local, regional, tribal, and
federal domestic terrorism prevention efforts. National Strategy included the President’s
definition of homeland security, a term heretofore unfamiliar to the public:

Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks
within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. (2002, p. 2)

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), launched in early 2003, was
intended as the main tool to intercept and obstruct terrorism, specifically anti-American
terrorism in the U.S. itself. Enacted by the Homeland Security Act in November 2002,
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DHS was meant to remedy the situation that led to 9/11; for example, to “streamline
information sharing” – widely believed to be a problem between FBI and CIA and
pinpointed as a reason for the success of the 9/11 attacks (9/11 National Commission,
2004). With the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, states the National Strategy for
Homeland Security, “Congress took important steps toward identifying and removing
some barriers to the exchange of intelligence” (as cited in Congressional Research
Service, 2002, page 48). The USA PATRIOT Act had already provided broad legal
support to the nation’s police departments and, according to prominent police experts
such as William Bratton and George Kelling, local law enforcement was in the best place
to detect terrorist activity (Newman & Clarke, 2008). This was later restated by Michael
McCaul (R-TX), chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, and senior
Committee member Bill Keating (D-MA):

[S]tate and local police know their city’s streets and residents better than
anyone. This knowledge makes them a force multiplier for federal law
enforcement’s efforts. Their insight and impact are huge considering that
nationwide there are just under 14,000 FBI agents, while in New York
alone there are almost 35,000 NYPD officers. Clearly, utilizing local law
enforcement expertise will ultimately result in keeping more Americans
safe and mitigating the risk of terrorist attacks (2014).

DHS quickly followed up its launch with financial support for the police by
establishing the Homeland Security Grants Program, which has allotted billions in
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equipment, software, training, and vendor services to branch offices in all 50 states and
the U.S. territories since 2003 (DHS, 2017). In addition, the new department created a
portfolio of grants for parties other than law enforcement, such as public transit agencies
and nonprofit organizations. According to the Congressional Research Service, between
2003 and 2011, DHS distributed over $40 billion in grants on homeland security (Reese,
2012).
Much of the funding received by police agencies from the Federal Emergency
Management Administration – the DHS organization that administers the grants allocated
for homeland security – goes toward the purchasing of general surveillance systems that
observe the public and can capture various forms of personal data. By looking at
implementations of three such technologies – surveillance video cameras, license plate
readers, and unmanned aerial vehicles – this thesis seeks to challenge the effectiveness of
DHS’s police grants based on two hypotheses: 1) general surveillance is a strategy not
suited for the prevention of terrorism, and 2) police departments are using their grant
allocations for purposes other than the detection of terrorists and terrorist activity.

Methodology
As a prism through which to view the research collected to examine my
hypotheses, this paper leverages a policy framework created by representatives of the
police themselves. In January 2014, the International Association of Chiefs of Police
(IACP) published its first guide to formulating policy for the implementation and use of
technological systems. The IACP’s “Policy Mandate” is clear and comprehensive and
reflects an institution that serves the public:
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Creating and enforcing agency policies that govern the deployment and
use of technology, protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of
individuals, as well as the privacy protections afforded to the data
collected, stored, and used, is essential to ensure effective and
sustainable implementation, and maintain community trust (2014, p. 2).

“Just because a technology can be implemented does not mean that it should be.”
This core tenet is part of the Technology Policy Framework by the IACP (p. 1). A
nonprofit membership organization comprised of current and former police leaders, it
was founded in 1893 to advance the “science and art of police services” by conducting
research – often in collaboration with federal agencies and academic institutions – and
issuing evidence-based policy guidelines for technical, administrative, and conductrelated police practices (IACP.org, 2016). In light of the rapid evolution of technologies
capable of recording and identifying personal data that have been made available to law
enforcement, IACP recognized the need of providing a comprehensive technology policy
framework as a resource to individual police departments. Using this framework, each
would be able to create policies governing its use of technologies that would ensure these
new tools deliver value toward policing goals while safeguarding the necessary trust and
cooperation of the public (IACP, 2014).
The Framework identifies those technologies whose use is of particular concern
to the public and most likely to be subject to legislative action, namely those that “have
the potential to monitor, capture, store, transmit and/or share data, including audio, video,
visual images, or other personally identifiable information which may include the time,
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data, and geographic location where the data were captured” (p. 3). Examples include the
three that form the focus of this thesis: surveillance video cameras, license plate readers,
and unmanned aerial systems. All three constitute devices for general, or mass,
surveillance; they are deployed by police in public locations – in stationary or mobile
form – and are trained on the public without any individualized suspicion that may
require a search warrant. At the same time, each captures visual, geographical, and
chronological data points that can reflect personally identifiable information, even –
given a sufficient amount collected over time – a history of destinations, habits, and
affiliations.
Despite the capacity to develop knowledge of individuals and their behavior, this
thesis argues that general surveillance modalities are unsuited as a prophylactic against
terrorism. Foremost among President Bush’s three goals of homeland security is to
prevent terrorism, and surveillance is inherently reactive – that is, its use is limited by the
need to have already recorded an incident. In addition to limiting the type of technologies
examined here, research for this paper focuses on implementations funded by DHS grants
designated exclusively to local or regional law enforcement, which are the State
Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, and the far less
prevalent Operation Stonegarden – together, these make up the Homeland Security
Grants Program.
Information on grant allocations, installations, and performance was drawn from a
variety of sources to represent different perspectives and target audiences; these include
academic journals, reports by government agencies such as the Government
Accountability Office, articles from police news mailings such as the Federal Law
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Enforcement Training Center’s TechBeat, publications from civil liberties nonprofits,
research studies from institutions such as George Mason University’s Center for
Evidence-Based Crime Policy and RAND Corporation, manuals from police
organizations such as COPS, items from topical online portals such as Homeland
Security Today, investigative journalism, and DHS.gov. These sources were monitored
and studied over a period of over four years to examine the steps taken by police
departments to identify the anti-terrorism equipment or systems to be covered by the
Homeland Security Grants Program as well as the process of implementation and the
outcome of these innovations. The analysis required to arrive at this paper’s conclusions
and recommendations was based on the guidelines comprising the IACP’s framework;
specifically, the “universal principles” that each police agency should adhere to when
deciding to acquire new technology (see Table 1 in Appendix).
These principles, or procedural steps, begin with the need to specify the objectives
of the desired technology, which should align with the objectives of the agency, as well
as what is required to implement and maintain it; for example, calculating total costs and
identifying necessary staffing and skills training. Use and storage policies need to be
documented and distributed regarding the data that is collected – be it video camera
footage or license plate scans – including where and how long it will be kept, how it may
be accessed and by whom; these rules should be shared with the public, providing
transparent privacy policies.
Framework principles further emphasize the importance of continually monitoring
whether equipment and data collection are serving a purpose and achieving stated
objectives, which requires defining in advance what metrics will be used to evaluate
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performance. “Agencies should regularly monitor and evaluate the performance and
value of technologies,” reads the document, “to determine whether continued deployment
is warranted …” (p. 3). Police departments must implement adequate technical and
infrastructural security against breach of data and identify what actions should be taken if
in case of failure. Finally, the IACP demands that each department’s sworn or civilian
personnel as well as possible contractors and volunteers are held accountable to its
technology policies as well as the law, and that violations are officially sanctioned as
determined in advance.
How and whether these universal principles are applied as revealed in the
literature sampled for this thesis addresses the hypotheses that surveillance technology is
inherently unfit for the prevention of terrorist incidents, and that police agencies are
relying on DHS grant allocations to fulfill objectives other than terrorism prevention.

Risk- and performance-based grant allocation
As part of delivering on its mission of homeland security, DHS assigned to the
Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) the responsibility of
distributing funding to local and state government agencies; these funds are available
through FEMA’s Preparedness, or Non-Disaster, grants programs toward the National
Preparedness Goal of a “secure and resilient Nation” (FEMA.org, 2017). There are eight
such programs, ranging from the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program
with a 2017 budget of $350 million to the Nonprofit Security Grant Program, whose $10
million budget has been allocated almost exclusively to Jewish advocacy organizations,
to the Port Security Grant Program with a 2017 budget of $100 million targeted at the
“highest-risk” ports in the U.S.
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Largest among the grants programs by far is the Homeland Security Grants
Program (HSGP), whose 2017 allocations amounted to over one billion dollars,
bolstering DHS policy of having local police constitute the “front line” in detecting
homegrown terrorist threats against America (see Table 2). HSGP consists of three types
of homeland security grant types exclusively available to law enforcement, targeted at
state agencies, urban agencies, and border-area agencies, respectively: the State
Homeland Security Program; the Urban Area Security Initiative; and the far smaller
Operation Stonegarden, intended for police in states neighboring national borders to
assist in DHS border security responsibilities.

Table 2. Homeland Security Grants Program, FY 2011 – 2017 (in $ millions)
Program

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

State Homeland
Security Program

526.8

294.0

354.6

401.3

402.0

402.0

402.0

Urban Area Security
Initiative

662.6

490.4

558.7

587.0

587.0

580.0

580.0

54.8

46.6

55.0

55.0

55.0

55.0

55.0

1,244.2

831.0

968.3

1,043.3

1,044.0

1,037.0

1,037.0

Operation Stonegarden
TOTAL
Source: DHS.gov, 2017

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 stipulated that federal funding was to be
distributed according to the level of risk of a terrorist attack. However, according to
repeated evaluations by the Government Accountability Office, DHS has struggled to
determine standard risk assessment formulae and the responsibility of assessing risk fell
to the police agencies themselves (2007; 2008; 2013). FEMA, a long-established federal
institution, had no previous experience with issues of terrorism and relied on these self-
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assessments in approving grant requests. Additionally, legislation outlined that each state
and territory receive a portion of the anti-terrorism funds regardless of risk. As a
consequence, appropriations per state through the State Homeland Grant Program have
not reflected even basic common sense; with Wyoming topping state anti-terrorist
spending in 2011 at $9 per resident, for example, while New York was last at $4.70 per
resident (see Table 3).

Table 3. Top 10 DHS Grant Recipients, in dollars per capita
1

Wyoming

$9.00

2

District of Columbia

$8.60

3

Vermont

$8.20

4

North Dakota

$7.50

5

Alaska

$7.10

6

South Dakota

$6.20

7

Delaware

$5.70

8

Montana

$5.10

9

Rhode Island

$4.90

10

New York

$4.70

Source: Stateline, 2011 (as cited in O’Sullivan, 2014).

South Dakota received $100 million in the decade from the grants’ launch in 2003
to 2013, making the state sixth in per-capita spending, despite being one of 15 states that
U.S. intelligence agencies rated in 2010 as having "no specific foreign or domestic
terrorism threat" (O’Sullivan, 2014). South Dakota has acquired equipment to detect
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IEDs, surveillance camera systems for schools, and electronic fingerprinting technology
based on the alleged threats of white supremacists and environmental terrorists targeting
the Keystone XL pipeline (2014). In Texas, where the Department of Public Safety was
designated in 2003 to administer the Homeland Security Grants Program, each of the
more than 1,400 county, city, and tribal jurisdictions submit grant requests to FEMA
every year (Stewart & Oliver, 2014).
It was only three years into the FEMA grants program that DHS added the
requirement for applying agencies to provide “investment justifications” that would be
used to inform funding decisions (GAO, 2007). Also in Fiscal Year 2006, DHS made
public its risk assessment method used to determine which cities would be eligible for
Urban Areas Security Initiative grants; the number of recipients had grown from an initial
seven to 43 in FY 2005. The new risk analysis would comprise components threat,
vulnerability, and consequences (2007). However, the GAO found in 2008 that DHS
assigned every state and urban area the same vulnerability score, as though they were
equally vulnerable to a terrorist attack; this significantly undermined the credibility of the
department’s risk assessments (GAO, 2008). A study conducted in 2007 of Texas police
chiefs established that it was the receipt of homeland security funds that drove local
agencies to implement anti-terrorism initiatives and not a perceived risk of terrorism; that
in fact, only 42 percent of grant applicants had conducted a risk assessment of their locale
(Stewart & Oliver, 2014).
In 2012, FEMA released a self-assessment toolkit for HSGP applicants called
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) to help police
departments identify possible terrorist targets in their areas, opportunities for terrorism,
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and the likelihood of attacks being staged. THIRA was not intended for use in FEMA’s
evaluation of funding proposals (GAO, 2013). Instead, the mechanism was supposed to
be matched with “national capability performance requirements and measures” for
longitudinal success evaluations; these, however, had not been developed.
Without assessing the risk of terrorism to an individual locale and without
assessing the effectiveness of the technology requested to reduce that risk level, grants
are awarded primarily based on the self-reported needs of police applicants. As a
consequence, Dillingham, Alaska – a town of 2,400 – received a $202,000 grant for
surveillance cameras, claiming that being a port city it was attractive to potential
terrorists (Earle, 2006). In his 2012 report, Safety at Any Price, Senator Tom Coburn (ROK) examined the performance of FEMA’s largest individual homeland security grant
program, UASI, and concluded that “With so few accountability measures in place, there
is almost no way to ensure taxpayers are getting value for their money, and more
importantly, whether they are safer” (p. 5). He noted that among the $7.1 billion spent
through UASI grants to date, $98,000 had gone toward an underwater robot for
Columbus, Ohio, to assist in rescue missions. Keene, NH, with a population of 23,000
had not only been designated a high-risk urban area but had secured a UASI grant for a
BearCat armored vehicle to protect the town’s annual pumpkin festival (Coburn, 2012).
Referring to the Homeland Security Grants Program as a whole, DHS’s own
Inspector General reported in 2012 that FEMA did “not have a system in place to
determine the extent that Homeland Security Grant Program funds enhanced the states’
capabilities to prevent, deter, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major
disasters and other emergencies” (DHS OIG, 2012, p. 1).
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FEMA’s lack of performance measures makes it unable to hold police
departments accountable for their investments, or even to control whether the funds
received are being spent on anti-terrorist technology. Regardless of the basis for receiving
DHS funds, spending them is under the purview of the individual police departments. In
the absence of procedures to evaluate police implementations to counter threats, police
officials can choose to spend awards according to their own preferences and goals.
Former New York police commissioner William Bratton has exhibited arguable
disregard of the DHS mission of terrorism prevention. “One of the great benefits New
York gets out of being the most likely terrorist target,” he boasted in 2014, “is that the
funds that come in help us on the more prevalent issue of day-to-day crime” (Smith,
2014). While this may align with the IACP Framework’s first universal principle of
making technology use align with departmental objectives, it violates the intent and
purpose of the federal homeland security grants.

Prevention in policing
Given the amount of grants available, the flexibility in their allocation, and the
low likelihood of a terrorist attack in any domestic locale, it is no wonder that state and
local police agencies are seeking to use new tools to meet longstanding objectives such as
countering crime rather than terrorism. Some policing experts argue that – whether in
preparation for an attack or merely for survival – potential terrorists are likely to commit
“ordinary” crimes such as robbery and drug dealing, even that terrorism itself is just
another type of crime (Newman & Clarke, 2008). Addressing police executives in
particular, the Office of Community Oriented Police Services (COPS) emphasizes,
however, that any changes made in their new role of policing terrorism “put a premium
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on prevention, on service to the community” (2008, Brief 02) – requirements that uphold
the oldest and founding principles in police work.
When post-industrialization London began to experience increasingly violent
protests by factory workers and city residents perceived a rise in crime, recently
appointed Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel was chosen to design the first modern police
department (Johnson, 1981). At its launch in 1829, Peel issued to all officers a handbook
that stated, “The object to be attained is the prevention of crime” (Reith, 1948, p. 62). He
designated prevention policing a better method to keep citizens and property safe than
would be the arrest of offenders after the fact. On foot patrol around the clock, police
officers in the U.K. and – beginning in the 1840s – in the U.S. mingled physically with
community members, gaining familiarity and trust with their constituents, and were thus
able to preserve order and dissuade troublesome incidents (Johnson, 1981). “The test of
police efficiency,” informs Peel’s Nine Principles of Policing, “is the absence of crime
and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them” (Reith,
1948).
Key to prevention policing was the police uniform, whose deterrent function
arguably makes it the first example of policing technology. The uniform also contributed
to the accountability of individual officer as it identified him as a member of the police
force to the public and forced him to behave professionally and in accordance with the
law. Ironically, many police recruits initially protested against wearing the uniform,
claiming it “smacked of subordination and tyranny” (Johnson, 1981, p. 28), not realizing
how quickly it was to become a symbol instead of power and authority over regular
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citizens. This has been especially true in the U.S., where police officers officially carry
firearms, thereby exacerbating the power inequity with civilians.
Peel’s paradigm of prevention policing is best represented by the 20th century’s
community policing, which was heavily infringed by the surge in the 1990s of “broken
windows” and “zero-tolerance” methods that relied largely on making arrests. The
anathema of arrests to crime prevention is argued by researchers Cynthia Lum and Daniel
Nagin of the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, who cite both financial and social
costs (2015). When interactions with the police began to generate overwhelmingly
negative output – arrests and searches – the relationships with especially black and
Hispanic neighborhoods soured, a phenomenon that Lum and Nagin seek to reverse in
their blueprint (2015). Echoing the COPS and Peel directives to serve and earn respect
from the public, they make inextricable the principles of crime prevention and “citizen
reaction matters”; i.e., that regardless of the effectiveness of a given policing method, it
must be reconciled with the community (2015). This is not merely to provide the positive
quality-of-life outcome, as is associated with community policing (Kelling & Moore,
1988), but also to ensure success of mutually agreed-upon crime prevention tactics.
RAND policy analysts add another benefit to “seeking the input of ordinary citizens,”
namely that this “confers local police with greater authority and legitimacy” (Treverton,
Wollman, Wilke, et al, 2011, p. 25) – precisely what is needed to sustain cooperation.
Crime prevention can take many forms, including environmental design,
structural design, and target hardening – the defining characteristic is that it inhibits
undesired action. Increased street lighting has been shown widely to reduce crime – both
violent and property – as well as make people feel safer (Welsh & Farrington, 2008).
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When plane hijackings started to take place in the 1970s, the installation of metal
detectors was able to reduce their occurrence (Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2008); post9/11, airline manufacturers undertook widespread action to thicken cockpit doors to be
resistant to attack. Crime prevention through environmental design (also known as
CPTED) can be accomplished by simple changes to property through landscaping, adding
fences, or removing thick hedges that serve to hide trespassing. Prickly vegetation
underneath low-level windows can serve as a natural deterrence to would-be burglars
(DesignOutCrime.com, 2011). These efforts can be undertaken by individual residents or
by communities in collaboration with their local police departments as part of community
policing, with its focus on prevention and transparency. The Los Angeles Police
Department, for example, has an extensive CPTED initiative in place that was forged in
partnership with consultancy Design Out Crime and can be explored on the department’s
Web site (LAPD, 2016).
After the 2001 terrorist attacks, however, over 80 percent of local law
enforcement agencies responding to an IACP survey reported shifting their focus and
efforts away from crime prevention in favor of counterterrorism (as cited in Kim & de
Guzman, 2012).
Anti-terrorism implementations
[O]nly those technologies, and only those data, that are strictly needed to
accomplish the specific objectives approved by the agency will be
deployed, and only for so long as it demonstrates continuing value. (IACP,
2014, p. 3)
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To justify the expense of the terrorism prevention system to be implemented, of
training and human resources, and of maintenance, storage, and monitoring, as well as
the potential shift in agency focus, the unknown latent consequences such as impact on
community relations, the potential dependence on third-party manufacturers or
contractors, and other eventualities, it would seem like commonsense to have evidentiary
grounds to believe in the system’s success. Yet a comprehensive review of terrorism
research revealed an almost complete lack of scientific study (Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley,
2008). A 2003 search across 17 literary databases and multiple disciplines returned
14,000 articles containing references to terrorism, spanning a period from the early 1960s
through 2002. Of the peer-reviewed articles, which one might assume would be likely
based on empirical, if not quantitative, analysis, only three percent were.
Over half of the 40 years of pieces were written in just two years, 2001 and 2002,
clearly as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks; still, 96 percent constituted “thought
pieces,” offering no evidentiary basis for the terrorism prevention policies that were
forged during these and the following years (Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2008). Most
importantly, in the context of this thesis, none of the empirical or evaluation antiterrorism studies were conducted on the use of surveillance technologies, despite them
having been available long before 2001. The only studies involving law enforcement
were of airport security measures such as metal detectors; only 0.6 percent of peerreviewed articles concerned themselves with domestic terrorism (2008, Table 1, p. 37).
These results appearing during precisely the time that DHS was created and its
missions articulated, and the overall fear of another incident of domestic terrorism, do not
indicate a timely shift in research toward identifying working prevention mechanisms. In
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a 2007 survey of local law enforcement agencies, only 11 percent reported any
interactions with the research community (Lum & Fachner, as cited in Lum, Haberfeld,
Fachner, & Lieberman, 2011). This strongly indicates that the choices by police and
sheriff departments of surveillance video cameras, license plate readers, and unmanned
aerial vehicles as preventive tools against domestic terrorism have been based largely on
factors other than proven effectiveness. Referred to as “general surveillance” because
they monitor the public at large based only on geographic location, these technologies
generate records that must first be interpreted by humans before any intervention can take
place; general surveillance is inherently a reactive mechanism, which makes it of
questionable use for the prevention of crime or terrorism.

Surveillance video cameras or CCTV (closed-circuit television)
CCTV advocates have successfully marketed limited evidence of success
in very specific areas (parking lots) as an effective crime prevention
strategy for both violence and property crime prevention in ALL public
places. (Haggerty, as cited in Byrne & Marx, 2011, p. 22)

Surveillance cameras are deployed for generally three purposes: to deter criminal
activity, to investigate crimes and identify suspects, and to instill a feeling of safety
among citizens. When visible, the cameras intend to deter individuals from engaging in
unwelcome activity by presenting the possibility of getting caught; second, to apprehend
suspects identified on tape, which can serve as evidence in court; and finally, to reassure
residents they can move safely, without threats posed by unmonitored individuals.
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CCTV is best known for decades of permeating Britain as a response to wide-spread
bomb attacks by Northern Ireland’s IRA. British police reported that although the
cameras had been implemented with deterrence in mind, reality had shown them to be
purely investigatory. “There's no fear of CCTV,” stated Detective Chief Inspector Mick
Neville at London’s Metropolitan Police. “Why don't people fear it? [They think] the
cameras are not working” (Bowcott, 2008).
This is not an unreasonable assumption. A 2004 $45 million UASI grant went to
Chicago’s Cook County to launch “Project Shield,” which was to outfit two police
vehicles in each of the 128 suburbs with surveillance cameras feeding live video to a data
analysis command center; in addition, the suburbs themselves were to have mounted
cameras in place (Marin & Moseley, 2012). Three years after the project went into
implementation, reports emerged of fraud and mismanagement by contractor IBM. In
2012, an investigation found that cameras were not being maintained, many had not been
tested before implementation and had never worked, and police had selected locations for
the mounted cameras of “questionable homeland security benefits” – namely, facing
police parking lots and inside precinct lobbies. Project Shield was scrapped as a total
failure, leading then-Representative Mike Quigley to address the Government
Accountability Office: “We have spent hundreds of millions of dollars across the country
on homeland security. If Project Shield is any indication, we are less safe” (Marin &
Moseley, 2012).
As a method to deter violent crime, surveillance cameras have shown little
success. In repeated studies with convicted armed robbers and thieves, participants were
asked to rank a list of crime prevention methods in order of deterrence. All placed

20
surveillance cameras near or at the bottom; police patrol figured among the top deterrents
(Schlosberg & Ozer, 2007). Participants said they were not afraid of cameras because
they “knew” nobody was watching. Video footage witnesses activity; it has not been
shown to be useful as a deterrent. A 2002 study of 22 implementations of CCTV in both
Britain and the U.S. concluded that “while cameras could have a marked effect on
reducing vehicle crime, there was little evidence they prevented violent crime” (BBC,
2002). In fact, follow-up reports found that street lighting was more effective in
preventing violent crime and property crime (2002). Yet in 2009 London alone had one
million cameras installed, according to an internal police report, and even when used for
investigative purposes, CCTV could claim but one crime solved annually per 1,000
cameras (BBC, 2009).
In spite of dubious success abroad and very little research on implementations in
the U.S., local police departments continue to request systems that are almost certainly
not going to detect terrorist activity and are dramatically invasive. The Boston
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, having saturated its subway system, successfully
applied for a DHS grant for $6.7 million to equip its buses with surveillance cameras,
which now record two-thirds of Boston’s bus trips (Powers, 2014).
The remote and reactive properties inherent to CCTV arguably present a hazard to
public safety in that the installations of such systems allow local law enforcement to rely
on them to replace the need for human patrol. NYPD chief Bratton might want to
reevaluate New York’s anti-terrorist preparedness in light of what took place on July 22,
2014. In the early hours of the morning, a group of artists walked onto the Brooklyn
Bridge, replaced the U.S. flags with white ones, and left the scene without being detected
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or apprehended (Schneider, 2014). They were able to carry out this stunt despite the 2011
installment of 1,800 surveillance cameras in Manhattan, at the cost of nearly $200 million
to DHS (Kappstatter, 2011). In its failure to avert what could have been a successful
terrorist attack, New York City’s surveillance system demonstrated the ineffectiveness of
surveillance video for that purpose. In its first eight months, the Ring of Steel, as dubbed
by then-police commissioner Ray Kelly, had enabled the arrest of 100 suspects of crimes
such as assault and purse-snatching, according to the NYPD. Kelly pointed out the Ring’s
accomplishments of detecting “bags left on the sidewalk,” which he claimed could be
indicators of terrorism, and said the city would soon double the amount of cameras
(2011).
Based on the examples discussed in this section it is apparent that surveillance
camera installations in the U.S. have not had a measurable impact on preventing
terrorism. CCTV is a surveillance technology that has limited, post-facto applications,
mainly in investigative policing.

License plate readers
From 2006 through 2011, DHS awarded over $50 million in grants to local police
departments for purchasing license plate readers (LPRs); recipients included Los
Angeles; a Georgia county of 23,000; and municipalities of varying sizes in between
(Angwin & Valentino-Devries, 2012). LPR technology falls under “general surveillance”
because, like video cameras, it surveys the public indiscriminately. However, while
camera networks continuously videotape without predefined data points, license plate
readers are manufactured to grab individual “scans” of all license plates within its range,
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along with the time and location of each capture, and can run these through a database to
identify matches. License plate readers have traditionally been “portable,” meaning they
are installed onto a law enforcement vehicle. Police purchasers have the option of
“mobile” readers – units that can be moved among vehicles. Location information is
recorded using GPS in the case of LPRs affixed to these vehicles; for stationary or
mounted LPRs, it is recorded according to reader location; e.g., in the form of a particular
street intersection.
In a 2004 study, the Ohio State Highway Patrol – in partnership with LPR
manufacturer Remington-Elsag – mounted LPRs at Ohio Turnpike toll booths to scan the
license plate of each vehicle driving onto the Ohio turnpike (OSHP, 2005). OSHP had a
“hot list” of 345,000 license plate numbers tied to stolen automobiles or wanted felons,
most of which had been provided by the National Crime Information Center, with 8,000
being Ohio license plates. By the end of the four-month research period, the LPRs affixed
to the three toll booths had stored almost 1.9 million scans; according to toll booth
operators, this amount meant that the devices had failed to scan 14 percent of total
turnpike entries during this period. Moreover, not all scans were of license plates; some
were of strings of numbers from elsewhere on a vehicle. Altogether, the scans generated
3,286 alarms, of which only 108 were considered “positive” in that both state and license
plate number matched state and license plate number of the entry on the hot list (see Figure
1). Ultimately, only 17 scans triggered valid alarms, meaning that they led to an arrest; this

translates to one valid alarm in 194 alarms registered by the LPR system. Despite
automation, it is clear that the use of LPRs requires significant police work in comparing
scans to hot list entries for verification. Meanwhile, the deterrence effect of police
officers patrolling an area for stolen vehicles is disabled.
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Figure 1. Alarms per LPR scans

Because LPR scans can recognize specific identifiable information, if monitored
in real time, officers can apply the data immediately to pursue the vehicle identified.
Whether this technology is more effective than patrol officers working off a hot list has
been tested. The Police Executive Research Foundation and the Mesa, Arizona, police
department collaborated on a 48-week study to compare the results of LPR technology
with those of manual license plate checks (Taylor, Koper, & Woods, 2010). Although
LPRs resulted in more immediate arrests and locating stolen cars, the areas monitored by
police patrol showed a long-term decrease in thefts, suggesting that the visibility of police
officers busily checking plates worked as a deterrent (Vergano, 2011). Consequently, it
would seem that the immediate recognizable benefit LPRs provide to conventional local
law enforcement is retrieval of stolen automobiles, which is unlikely to be of use in the
detection of terrorists.
IACP project manager Meghann Tracey confirms that the primary driver for
police to purchase LPR systems is to retrieve stolen cars (2010). Officers are also
attracted to LPRs because they allegedly allow for efficiency in traffic stops to capture
lapsed registrations, revoked licenses, and persons with outstanding arrests: “The quantity
of stops has gone down,” claims one state trooper, “because the quality of stops has gone
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up” (2010). However, Tracey says, the technology’s real strength lies in assisting
investigations through the storage of license plate scans over time, allowing police to
reconstruct the before and after movements of a person under suspicion of a crime that
has already occurred.
If there is an argument for LPRs as crime prevention method, it remains elusive.
By gathering license plate scans and storing them for analysis, police departments across
the country are feeding information to regional data centers for intelligence agencies to
possibly spot a pattern indicating terrorist intent. Police departments have come to view
surveillance not as a tool to prevent or intervene in unlawful activity, but as a reactive
mechanism to record all activity for undetermined and indeterminate use. The use of
LPRs for building databases of license plate scans presents an enhanced ability to spy on
individuals; the police department in Milpitas, California, with a population of 67,000,
has stored 4.7 million license plate scans, meaning that residents are recorded over and
over, providing an itinerary of their lives (Angwin & Valentino-Devries, 2012).

Unmanned aerial vehicles
Known more popularly as “drones,” unmanned aerial vehicles have long been used by the
military for surveillance and dropping bombs the world over. In the late 2000s,
manufacturers such as AeroVironment, the U.S. military’s largest supplier of unmanned
aerial vehicles, began to eye the domestic market and identified local law enforcement as
a potentially lucrative customer base (Gunderson, 2012). Unlike the Predator, made by
defense contractor General Atomics, AeroVironment’s UAVs are primarily “MAVs” –
micro aerial vehicles such as the Qube, Wasp, and Raven. MAVs have wingspans of only
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a few feet, weigh between one and four pounds, and are small enough to fit in a backpack
or car trunk. While they are not weaponized, they are outfitted for surveillance with zoom
lenses, infrared or thermal imaging cameras, and the capabilities to house radar and video
analytics such as facial recognition (Stanley & Crump, 2011). These devices – other
manufacturers include Honeywell and Draganfly Innovations – require far more hands-on
operation, staff, and training than most sheriffs and police chiefs realize, and they are
bound to specific flying rules. Departments seeking a cheaper and more nimble tool than
a helicopter must consider that a UAV of this type – which costs between $40,000 and
$200,000 – may fly at a maximum altitude of 400 feet and requires a trained pilot to
operate the vehicle. Operators must follow the FAA’s “line-of-sight” provision: the UAV
must always remain in sight of its pilot (2011). Moreover, UAVs are prohibited in
airspace over populated areas, airports, or harbors. MAVs are also limited to smooth
sailing – they cannot withstand windy weather and many cannot fly at night or during
low clouds. Flight time capabilities range from 10 to 110 minutes (2011; Gunderson,
2012; Thompson, 2012).
The first and to date primary use of UAVs in the U.S. has been by federal
agencies such as Customs and Border Protection, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives for surveillance – or
situational awareness – along the U.S. border with Mexico. Police departments
themselves most commonly first cite purposes of assisting in finding missing persons and
monitoring traffic accidents. When Medina County, Ohio, was cleared to deploy a 2.2pound drone in early 2013, the county sheriff Tom Miller offered the following
justification: “About two or three times a year, we have maybe kids or seniors with
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Alzheimer’s who have walked away” (Nethers, 2013). Drones granted to Arlington,
Texas; counties in northern Virginia; and elsewhere have all been funded with DHS antiterrorist grants to police departments who did not articulate an anti-terrorist need. Instead,
police officials tend to cite the protection of community members – even as they request
technology that has to date only been used against people. For example, the deputy
sheriff of Montgomery County, Texas, used a $300,000 DHS grant to purchase a
Shadowhawk drone, made by military supplier Vanguard Defense Industries (Langford,
2011). He, too, cited the location of missing persons as an objective, as well as directing
firefighters during forest fires. The Shadowhawk is weaponized for use in Iraq and
Afghanistan and, while Deputy Sheriff Randy McDaniel insisted the county’s version
would not be, Vanguard can provide law enforcement the use of tear gas canisters, flares,
smoke, and beanbag projectiles (2011).
Without the adherence to the simple IACP principle that requested technology
comply with state law and regulations, many police departments eager to use UASI
grants for UAVs may be unable to use them. In 2011, an unmanned aerial vehicle was
purchased by Honolulu contractor responsible for port security to patrol the city’s harbor
without seeking permission from the Federal Aviation Administration (Dooley, 2012).
The $75,000 drone had to be relegated to storage due to FAA guidelines that forbade
UAVs from entering harbor airspace. In 2014, the San Jose, California, police department
purchased a UAV with a $7,000 UASI grant, knowing full well it would not be able to
use it because the department had yet to fill out an application with the FAA. The San
Jose PD does already know how it will utilize its homeland security purchase: to help
Bay Area bomb squads conduct threat assessments and to “inspect state parks and

27
wilderness areas for illegal vegetation” (Farivar, 2014). For its part, Arlington, Texas,
received permission from the FAA to fly its two drones from Leptron Industrial
Helicopters that it purchased with a UASI grant (Govers III, 2013). Home to the Dallas
Cowboys, the Arlington police department requested the grant to provide security during
potential Superbowls; however, it is against FAA rules to fly UAVs above crowds for
safety reasons (Thompson, 2012). More everyday missions for the Leptron Avengers
would be to locate missing persons and to take crime scene photos – neither having any
preventive underpinning (Govers III, 2013).

Policing the public
If [citizens’] trust is violated and public approval lost, police are not able
to effectively perform their duties to keep communities safe.
(IACP, 2014, p. 2)

In the years after the 2001 terrorist attacks, police departments saw their funding
from COPS eclipsed by funding from DHS; in 2008, according to the Office of
Management and Budget, overall federal spending on counterterrorism led federal
spending on crime prevention by 15 billion (as cited in Stewart & Oliver, 2014). A
tendency to deemphasize public partnership as a paradigm was perhaps to be predicted.
Post-9/11, policing mentality and tactics seem to have morphed from community policing
to policing the community. Criminal justice researchers Kim and de Guzman believe the
so-called “war on terror” awakened a paramilitary mindset among officers and paved the
way for a shift to homeland security policing (2012, p. 323) – the current policing era.
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Like previous major shifts in police strategy, this shift correlates with, and may be largely
due to, new technology.
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Homeland Security Grants Program spawned
the implementation of general surveillance in every region of the country, regardless of
risk, and usually without the transparency and approval of the public that research and the
IACP Framework so emphatically recommend. Many urban ethnic and religious
communities experienced additional invasive policing methods such as infiltration and
street searches, which broke trusting relations established between community leaders
such as imams and law enforcement (de la Peña, 2004). Considering also the bruised
relationship between minority populations and the police sustained through previous
policing methods, officers have arguably lost significant public trust in 21st century
America, and thereby a crucial partner in preventing crime. A recent Gallup poll write-up
titled “Confidence in Police Back at Historical Average” reported that 57 percent of
Americans have confidence in the police (Norman, 2017). However, this headline and
percentage reflects a growth only among older white Conservatives and Republicans.
Confidence among blacks is at 30 percent and among Hispanics 45 percent; moreover,
the past two years have seen drops among Liberals, Democrats, and 18- to 34-year-olds
with confidence percentages of 39, 44, and 44, respectively (2017). This thesis does not
mean to attribute these confidence level changes to surveillance technology usage but to
point out that the trust considered vital to police functions, such as detection of terrorist
activity in the community, is lacking.
The technological advancements introduced over the 20th century may have
planted the seed for the remote and reactive policing favored today. The rise of telephone
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dispatch encouraged motorized patrol, for example; instead of the community beat cop
being on-site to deter crime, police car patrol became a mechanism of waiting to respond
to crime (Byrne & Marx, 2011). Even at rest, automobiles introduced a physical barrier to
the individual citizen and the lack of everyday interaction enabled a change in perception
among officers and civilians from “us and them” to “us versus them.” The introduction of
general surveillance deepens the divide; civilians en masse have become police targets
through the lens of assorted cameras permeating their neighborhoods and business
districts. Police surveillance underlines the appearance that officers view the community
primarily as a body of potential wrongdoers.
Surveillance technology manufacturers and law enforcement are quick to remind
citizens they do not have a right to privacy in public. License plate readers record what is
exposed on public streets. People cannot expect to be protected from video surveillance if
visible to passers-by. However, the Fourth Amendment adds to a person’s expectation of
privacy that it be reasonable. Justice Harlan first articulated a “constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy” in Katz v. United States (1967). Justice Harlan’s two‐
fold test is “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.” People videotaped through open windows by police in a publicly parked car
cannot reasonably expect privacy. If they retire to their bedroom, which faces the
backyard, and see a five-pound, camera-equipped police quadcopter hovering at their
open window, they may not be legally entitled to privacy, but it is hard to imagine that
anyone would consider this reasonable.
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Police chiefs have now had years of experience witnessing the pitfalls of
deploying new police technology outside of a formal process such as the one proscribed
by the IACP Framework (2014). Not involving the public in purchasing decisions and
roll-out requirements, for example, and not making plain what purposes a given device
might have, has in places caused anger and distrust among affected citizens toward local
law officers. One week after the Seattle Police Department abandoned its plan to fly two
unmanned aerial vehicles purchased with HSGP funds due to public outcry (Thompson,
2012; Clarridge, 2013), Seattle Mayor Mike McGinn invited the public to comment upon
the purchase of 30 surveillance video cameras through a $5 million DHS grant
(Clarridge, 2013b). The cameras had already been designated to shore up security along
the city’s waterfront and had already been installed; however, the mayor insisted on
delaying their activation until Seattle residents could weigh in.
A better example of police-community collaboration is Oakland’s 2014 creation
of a Privacy Commission, an advisory body to guide City Council decisions on
surveillance technologies proposed by law enforcement (Hofer, 2016). After participating
in the decision to purchase such a system, Commission members work together with the
Oakland Police Department in formulating transparency and privacy policies governing
its implementation (2016).

Summary of main findings
The research conducted for this thesis illuminated that general surveillance does
not function as a reliable deterrent of especially violent crime; surveillance cameras have
in select studies shown small results in thwarting property theft, particularly of
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automobiles. Instead, police implementations are using their new technology to add to
their toolbox for the investigation of crime and locating already-identified suspects.
According to a multi-site study on police implementations of technology in 2015,

The effectiveness of technology is most often measured in the same way
police effectiveness more generally is measured, by the ability to identify
people to solve cases and make arrests. (Koper, Lum, Willis, et al, 2015, p.
144)

Police officers are also feeding the terabytes of data generated across the nation’s
LPR and CCTV systems as well as footage from the occasional UAV mission to the data
centers established by DHS and manned by intelligence analysts seeking clues to terrorist
activity. This does not make these technologies preventive of terrorism; rather, it makes
local law enforcement into information providers for federal prevention efforts.
We have also witnessed how police agencies are responding to the availability of
the Homeland Security Grants Program by applying because it is there and not out of
perceived risk of terrorism to their locale. Because of lacking oversight and performance
measures from FEMA, local police have had trouble neither in securing grants without
showing cause nor in translating their funding into the gadgets they desire. These other
objectives may align with policing principles but do not align with the mandate of DHS.
With these results, it seems clear that instruments of public surveillance are not effective
in achieving homeland security, even while in isolated cases they can serve as a deterrent
to select crimes. It would seem that police are aware of the large gap between probability
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of terrorism and the need for preventive measures and are taking advantage of DHS’s
police grants to serve other purposes.

Conclusion
Even though the terrorists’ success in attacking the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon that fateful Tuesday was widely blamed on the lack of cooperation between
FBI and CIA (9/11 Commission, 2004) and even though it was an FBI field agent who
wrote the Phoenix Memo to headquarters that warned of the strange behavior of Saudi
Arabian flight school students in Minnesota (2004), Congress decided through the USA
PATRIOT Act that, in the “war against terror,” it was the role of local police officers that
needed to be enhanced.
When lawmakers identified local police officers as best positioned to discover
homeland threats, they argued it was because police officers are in touch with the people
who live in the homeland. Street cops are physically present to witness human interaction
and everyday routines. It is ironic, therefore, that the awards issued to local police
departments have only served to create distance; sitting in cars, precincts, and fusion
centers watching screens makes officers just as remote as the legislators in Washington.
What local law enforcement agencies in cities, towns, even rural regions are paying evercloser attention to is the data output of general surveillance devices – the reams of
footage of innocuous activities and interactions of everyday citizens. Lacking real-time
monitoring, the purpose of this output is to feed local DHS data centers, which does not
benefit the communities being recorded. Stored data cannot deter crime or intervene
where dangerous situations emerge, as a beat cop might. Remote and reactive technology
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cannot serve as a “force multiplier” or replacement for human street patrol when the goal
is prevention. The function of deterrence in crime-fighting is neglected – it does not serve
the purpose of collecting personally identifiable data. If the goal is enhancing data
profiles, preventive strategies are beside the point.
The finding that homeland security grants are obtained largely without believing
in a local risk of terrorism ought to be discouraging for DHS and a reason to formulate
better processes of evaluating grant proposals and risk assessments. It would also make
sense to recognize that police are not terrorism experts – hardly anyone is, and given the
lack of terrorism science, there is no basis for having law enforcement officials conduct
their own risk assessments. Further, there is no basis for law enforcement to choose
surveillance mechanisms for prevention; should surveillance be valuable for other
policing purposes, that argument must be made through evaluation research, cost-benefit
analyses, and consider Lum and Nagin’s “citizen reaction matters” factor. Grounded in
the IACP principles that demand the police act on behalf of the citizenry is the
recommendation to return to an era of police officers enjoying the popularity of foot
patrol (Kelling & Moore, 1988) and the deterrent effect of the uniform (Johnson, 1981)
and getting to know their constituents. As Peel pointed out, police cannot execute their
functions without “public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour” (Reith,
1948), and much of the public, particularly minority populations, lacks the requisite faith
in today’s policing.
Good policies governing the use of technology are anchored in public service and
democratic principles, as proscribed by Peel (1829), COPS (2008), Lum & Nagin (2015),
and the IACP (2014) to name but a few of those focusing on outcomes rather than output.
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Innovation – whether in technology or policy – should advance goals of the people, not
alienate them. “The core values that define us as a country are what make us strong as a
nation,” says ACLU Chairman Anthony Romero (de la Peña, 2004). “They’re not a
weakness.”
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Appendix
Table 1. IACP Technology Policy Framework: Universal Principles
Agencies should define the purpose, objectives,
and requirements for implementing specific
1

Specification of use

technologies, and identify the types of data
captured, stored, generated, or otherwise
produced.
Agencies should articulate in writing, educate
personnel regarding, and enforce agency
policies and procedures governing adoption,
deployment, use, and access to the technology

2

Policies and Procedures

and the data it provides. These policies and
procedures should be reviewed and updated on
a regular basis, and whenever the technology or
its use, or use of the data it provides
significantly changes.
The agency should assess the privacy risks and
recognize the privacy interests of all persons,
articulate privacy protections in agency
policies, and regularly review and evaluate

3

Privacy and Data Quality

technology deployment, access, use, data
sharing, and privacy policies to ensure data
quality (i.e., accurate, timely, and complete
information) and compliance with local, state,
and federal laws, constitutional mandates,
policies, and practice.
The agency should recognize that only those

Data Minimization and
4
Limitation

technologies, and only those data, that are
strictly needed to accomplish the specific
objectives approved by the agency will be
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deployed, and only for so long as it
demonstrates continuing value and alignment
with applicable constitutional, legislative,
regulatory, judicial, and policy mandates.
Agencies should regularly monitor and evaluate
the performance and value of technologies to
5

Performance Evaluation

determine whether continued deployment and
use is warranted on operational, tactical, and
technical grounds.
Agencies should employ open and public
communication and decision‐making regarding
the adoption, deployment, use, and access to
technology, the data it provides, and the
policies governing its use. When and where
appropriate, the decision‐making process
should also involve governing/oversight bodies,
particularly in the procurement process.

6

Transparency and Notice

Agencies should provide notice, when
applicable, regarding the deployment and use of
technologies, as well as make their privacy
policies available to the public. There are
practical and legal exceptions to this principle
for technologies that are practical and legal
exceptions to this principle for technologies that
are lawfully deployed in undercover
investigations and legitimate, approved covert
operations.
Agencies should develop and implement

7

Security

technical, operational, and policy tools and
resources to establish and ensure appropriate
security of the technology (including networks
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and infrastructure) and the data it provides to
safeguard against risks of loss, unauthorized
access or use, destruction, modification, or
unintended or inappropriate disclosure. This
principle includes meeting state and federal
security mandates (e.g., the FBI’s CJIS Security
Policy), and having procedures in place to
respond if a data breach, loss, compromise, or
unauthorized disclosure occurs, including
whether, how, and when affected persons will
be notified, and remedial and corrective actions
to be taken.
Agencies should have a policy that clearly
articulates that data collection, retention,
access, and use practices are aligned with their
Data Retention, Access, and
8
Use

strategic and tactical objectives, and that data
are retained in conformance with local, state,
and/or federal statute/law or retention policies,
and only as long as it has a demonstrable,
practical value.
Agencies and their sworn and civilian
employees, contractors, subcontractors, and
volunteers should be held accountable for
complying with agency, state, and federal
policies surrounding the deployment and use of

9

Auditing and Accountability

the technology and the data it provides. All
access to data derived and/or generated from
the use of relevant technologies should be
subject to specific authorization and strictly and
regularly audited to ensure policy compliance
and data integrity. Sanctions for non‐
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compliance should be defined and enforced.
Source: IACP, 2014

